In this short note, I examine the rationality of money-search equilibrium in a basic second-generation money search model, which is a perfectly divisible goods and indivisible money model. I then show that only an inflationary economy can generate a socially and individually rational stable equilibrium. On the basis of this finding, I demonstrate that there is no loss of generality in an analysis that assumes dictatorial buyers in an inflationary economy, since the properties of a dictatorial buyers model are identical to those of a general inflationary economy model. The result of this paper is especially useful for empirical applications since we are generally incapable of finding data showing bargaining power. This result also alerts us against employing the second-generation model to analyze a deflationary economy and commodity money.
Introduction
The second-generation money-search model (Trejos and Wright [1] ) considers a decentralized market model by using perfectly divisible goods and indivisible money. In the model, each agent judges the goods according to his own taste, and he derives utility from consuming specific goods. Each agent is also endowed with the capability of producing particular product types. Agents live for an infinitely long period and are randomly paired in every period in a Poisson matching process so that the matching process continues forever. In the model, all agents discount the future by a common discount rate represented by β ∈ (0,1). If the paired agents like each other's products (e.g. double coincidence of wants), they can enter into barter trade. If there is no double coincidence of wants but one likes the product of the paired agent, the one must have "money" to enter into monetary trade.
At the beginning of the entire matching process, money is randomly distributed among agents at probability represented by μ ∈ (0, 1), and it is transferred among them through monetary transactions. Both in barter and monetary transactions, bilateral bargaining determines the quantity of trade (e.g. Nash bargaining solution). The seller in the monetary trade must not be a money holder, as the model does not allow agents to carry more than two units of money. If there is no coincidence, there is no trade. The formal mathematical model is developed as follows.
Formal Model
Let q d be the quantity of consumption and q s be the quantity of the sale (production) of a particular product type. Given that an agent consumes a product that he likes, we let the utility function be uʹ ( (0) cʹ(0) and uʹ(∞) cʹ(∞). The coincidence of wants is supposed to be stochastic, and its probability is given by α ∈ (0,1). The probability of double coincidence of wants is α 2 and that of no coincidence is (1 − α) 2 , so that the probability of single coincidence is calculated as
For a seller, once he is paired, the probability of monetary trade is then α(1 − α)μ. Similarly, for a buyer, it is
Let V 0 (t) and V 1 (t) be the value functions of the nonmoney holder and money holder at period t, respectively, and τ > 0 be the length of each period; hence, the periodical discount rate is approximated by τβ for sufficiently small τ. Let λ 0 > 0 be the arrival rate at each moment in the Poisson process. Without loss of generality, we can make τ sufficiently small for λ 0 < 1 (e.g., agents are paired once per period at most). Let p 0 = α(1 − α)μλ 0 be the probability for a buyer meeting a seller to T. SAITO 284 make a monetary transaction in the matching process and p 1 = α(1 − α)(1 − μ)λ 0 be that of a seller meeting a buyer to make a monetary transaction. Let p 2 = α 2 λ 0 be the probability of barter trade between both the buyer and seller. In this specification, τp m represents the probability of each event m ∈ {0, 1, 2} per period. Let be the time derivative of V m (t) so that
Then, for τ → 0, the Bellman equation for the seller satisfies
where is the net utility from barter
aneous social welfare maximizer (Appendix 1).
where γ is the constant utility flow to store a un
where θ q  the instant Similarly, the Bellman equation for buyer satisfies
it of money for a period; hence γ < 0 implies that money is costly to store (fiat money) and vice versa for γ > 0 (commodity money).
Search Equilibrium
In the equilibrium, we have and supply must be equal, where q is given as a Nash bargaining solution (Appendix 2) that satisfies
represents the bargaining power of the buyer in the Nash product. The two Bellman equations are then solved as
In Equation (6), F(q) is given by
where λ = α(1 − α)λ 0 is the arrival rate of a single
θβ; and otherwise monotonically increasing in q. Proof. By differentiating F(q), we find that (0) and at q → ∞ to that of cʹ(∞) in Equation (8). By rearranging the terms of (1 − θ)β -λ(θ − μ) ⋛ 0 for q = 0 and θβ + λ(θ − μ) ⋛ 0 for q → ∞, we obtain the conditions for each shape of F(q) as stated in this remark. We then find that the two inequalities do not satisfy the condition for the monotonically decreasing case.
Q.E.D.
The classification of F(q) stated in Remark 1 is depicted in Figure 1 . As is shown in this figure, F(q) cannot be ∪-shaped if θ ≤ μ, and it cannot be ∩-shaped if or later use in θ ≥ μ. F llows.
Remark 2. If θ = 1, as a dictatorial buyers model, F(q) cannot be ∩-shaped.
Since
hence, the equilibria are given by F(q) = 0, as depicted in Figure 2 . Note that we cannot have stable equilibrium in the ∪-shaped case if γ > 0 since the intercept is −γ. An equilibrium is stable if and only if we have F ʹ(q) < 0 (cross the horizontal axis from above). We can then find that a shift of F(q) toward the same direction creates opposite comparative statical results for the stable equilibria in the ∪-shaped F(q) and ∩-shaped F(q). For example, an increase in μ creates an upward shift of F(q) if the monetary trade is socially rational: u(q) ≥ c(q). In such a case, we conclude that the price level 1/q increases in the ∩-shaped case, while it declines in the ∩-shaped case. Therefore, it is very important to identify which shape appears in the analysis, unless we do not consider the rationality conditions, as in the next section.
Rationality and Stability of Equilibrium
Using Equations (3) and (4), we consider V 1 (t) − V 0 (q) at the steady
rium, the abov given by sh bargaining solution, Equation (5); whence, we find At the equilib e value, Equation (9) is equal to the value that is the Na
This equation is further arranged as 
my, F(q) is n is socially
Next, we consider money that is not costly to store as commodity money or as fiat money in a deflationary economy (γ > 0). In this case, to obtain stable equilibrium, F(q) must be ∩-shaped, so that θβ + λ(θ − μ) < 0. Then, for social rationality u(q) ≥ c(q), from Equation (11), we must have
For a money holder, participation in the matching market is individually rational if and only if a transaction is better than storing money forever, so that we must have
better than using money to obtain instantaneous utility; hence, no trade occurs. 
Final Remarks
This note has shown that stable equilibrium cannot be obtained if γ > 0 (Proposition 2). If γ ≤ 0, we can obtain stable equilibrium and The two results imply buyer (θ = 1) without loss of generality so long as we focus on the stable monetary trade equilibrium (Remark 2). This result is especially useful for empirical applications (for example, Saito [2] ) since we are generally incapable of finding data showing bargaining power. Yet, it should be noted that the result in welfare analysis would be affected by the choice of bargaining power and bargaining mechanism as suggested by Aruoba et al. [3] . At the same time, the result in this paper also suggests that we cannot analyze commodity money and a deflationary economy in this framework if we care about the stability of equilibrium.
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